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🚨 Major Crimes Investigation Bureau

Today Korean Social News for Beginners | 2025.08.27

0️⃣ Debate Over New Agency to Replace Prosecutor's Direct Investigation Powers

📌 Minister Jung Expresses Caution About Major Crimes Investigation Bureau Plan...National Investigation Committee Control Controversy

💬 Justice Minister Jung Sung-ho expressed a cautious stance on the Democratic Party's plan to establish a Major Crimes Investigation Bureau (MCIB). He particularly raised concerns about whether control through the National Investigation Committee would be a democratic mechanism or could increase the possibility of political interference. The Democratic Party is pushing to eliminate prosecutors' direct investigation powers and have the MCIB handle complex economic crimes exclusively, placing it under the Ministry of Public Administration and Security. However, disagreements between the government and ruling party continue, leading to ongoing controversy over specific implementation plans for prosecutorial reform.

💡 Summary

  • The Major Crimes Investigation Bureau aims to completely separate investigation and prosecution by replacing prosecutors' direct investigation powers.
  • There is debate about whether the National Investigation Committee's control of the MCIB can prevent political interference.
  • It's designed as an agency specializing in complex economic crimes, but securing professional investigation capabilities is a key issue.

1️⃣ Definition

The Major Crimes Investigation Bureau refers to an independent investigation agency being proposed to replace prosecutors' direct investigation authority. It is designed to handle economic crimes requiring high expertise, such as capital market manipulation, financial crimes, and tax evasion.

Currently, prosecutors have both investigation and prosecution powers, which has been criticized for concentrating too much power. If the MCIB is established, prosecutors would only handle prosecution while the MCIB would be responsible for investigation, creating a complete separation of investigation and prosecution.

💡 Why is this important?

  • It's a key system to prevent prosecutors' abuse of power and politically biased investigations.
  • It can concentrate professional investigation capabilities on complex economic crimes.
  • It realizes the principle of checks and balances through separation of investigation and prosecution.
  • It would be an important milestone in Korea's judicial reform.

2️⃣ Main Content and Issues of the MCIB Establishment Plan

📕 Democratic Party's MCIB Establishment Plan

  • Complete abolition of prosecutors' direct investigation powers. The main content includes:

    • Transfer all current direct investigation powers from prosecutors to the MCIB.
    • Prosecutors would only retain prosecution and trial maintenance authority.
    • Main targets include complex economic crimes like capital market manipulation, financial crimes, and tax crimes.
    • Corruption and election crimes may also be included under MCIB jurisdiction.
  • Plan to establish the MCIB under the Ministry of Public Administration and Security. Key features include:

    • Placing it under the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, not the Ministry of Justice, to ensure independence from prosecutors.
    • The MCIB director would be appointed by the Prime Minister after National Assembly confirmation hearings.
    • Legal basis must be established through amendments to the Government Organization Act.
    • It's planned to start with approximately 1,000 staff members.

📕 Control Plan Through National Investigation Committee

  • The National Investigation Committee would control the MCIB and police. The main structure includes:

    • Composed of 1 chairperson and 8 members, with experts from various fields participating.
    • Deciding major investigation directions for the MCIB and police National Investigation Headquarters.
    • Handling coordination between investigation agencies and resolving conflicts.
    • Establishing a system for regular reports to the Prime Minister.
  • Political interference prevention mechanisms are a key issue. Main concerns include:

    • Political influence may work during the member composition process.
    • The Prime Minister reporting system could become a channel for administrative interference.
    • The challenge is to ensure investigative independence while realizing democratic control.
    • Setting the actual scope of authority and limits of the committee is an important issue.

💡 Major Issues of the MCIB Establishment Plan

  1. Political Independence: Questions about whether control through the National Investigation Committee can prevent political interference
  2. Securing Expertise: Possibility of building professional personnel and systems needed for complex economic crime investigations
  3. Inter-agency Cooperation: Efficient work division and cooperation systems between prosecutors, police, and MCIB
  4. Legal Basis: Complexity and time required for amending the Government Organization Act and related laws
  5. Budget and Personnel: Enormous costs and staffing needed to operate a new agency

3️⃣ Differences in Government and Ruling Party Positions and Future Outlook

✅ Justice Ministry's Cautious Approach

  • Minister Jung expressed concerns. His main positions include:

    • Questioning whether the National Investigation Committee's control is truly a democratic mechanism.
    • Arguing that more sophisticated institutional design is needed to prevent political interference.
    • Not clearly expressing agreement with the plan to place it under the Ministry of Public Administration and Security.
    • Acknowledging the need for prosecutorial reform while emphasizing careful review.
  • Concerns are also raised at the working level. Key issues include:

    • Investigation capabilities might actually weaken due to dispersion of existing special investigation expert personnel.
    • Concerns about confusion and work gaps from establishing a new agency.
    • Difficulty in building coordination and cooperation systems between prosecutors and the MCIB.
    • Burden of creating another large bureaucratic organization with taxpayer money.

✅ Future Outlook and Challenges

  • Political agreement is key. Main variables include:

    • Minimum agreement between ruling and opposition parties is needed to pass related bills in the National Assembly.
    • Amendment of the Government Organization Act is impossible without presidential consent.
    • The momentum for implementation could change greatly depending on the 2024 general election results.
    • Opinions from civil society and the legal community will also have important influence.
  • Phased implementation plans are likely to be considered. Main directions include:

    • Rather than full MCIB establishment, pilot operations starting with some functions are being discussed.
    • Gradual change approaches through improvement of existing agencies are also being considered.
    • Detailed institutional design through overseas case studies and expert opinion collection is needed.
    • Sufficient discussion and public relations for forming national consensus should precede implementation.

🔎 Prosecutors' Office Act

  • The Prosecutors' Office Act is the basic law regulating prosecutors' organization and authority.
    • The Prosecutors' Office Act is a law that regulates the organization of prosecutors' offices, prosecutors' duties and authority, and basic matters concerning prosecutorial operations. Enacted in 1949 and amended several times, it serves as the foundation of the prosecutorial system.
    • Main content includes: First, regulations on the organization and jurisdiction of the Supreme Prosecutors' Office, High Prosecutors' Offices, and District Prosecutors' Offices. Second, specification of prosecutors' core duties including investigation, prosecution, and trial maintenance authority. Third, appointment and authority of the Prosecutor General and chief prosecutors at each level. Fourth, provisions ensuring independence and political neutrality of prosecutorial affairs.
    • Regarding MCIB establishment, amendments are needed to remove prosecutors' direct investigation powers. Currently, Article 4 of the Prosecutors' Office Act specifies prosecutors' investigation authority, which would need to be changed to leave only prosecution and trial maintenance authority. This represents a major legal amendment signifying fundamental changes to the prosecutorial power structure.

🔎 Investigation Authority Adjustment

  • Investigation authority adjustment is a system that redistributes investigation powers between prosecutors and police.
    • Investigation authority adjustment refers to institutional reform that transfers primary investigation rights previously monopolized by prosecutors to police, allowing prosecutors to focus on prosecution and trials rather than direct investigation. Implemented in earnest from 2021, it brought major changes to the investigation paradigm.
    • Main content includes: First, police became responsible for primary investigation of most crimes. Second, prosecutors' authority to direct police investigations was abolished, transitioning to horizontal cooperative relationships. Third, prosecutors limited their direct investigation targets to six areas including corruption and economic crimes. Fourth, police were given the right to present opinions on whether to prosecute.
    • The MCIB can be seen as the completion of investigation authority adjustment. It aims to realize complete investigation-prosecution separation by transferring even prosecutors' remaining direct investigation powers to the MCIB. This would reduce prosecutors' role to purely handling prosecution and trials.

🔎 Government Organization Act

  • The Government Organization Act is a law regulating the establishment and operation of central administrative agencies.
    • The Government Organization Act is a basic law that regulates the establishment, organization, and scope of duties of the Prime Minister and various ministries and other central administrative agencies. Continuously amended since its enactment in 1948 according to government organizational restructuring, it is a constitutional law that determines the structure and functions of the executive branch.
    • The law's structure includes: First, regulations on establishment and functions of the Prime Minister's Office and Office for Government Policy Coordination. Second, specification of establishment basis and jurisdiction for each ministry including Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Justice. Third, establishment and affiliation of agency-level organizations. Fourth, legal basis for committees and special organizations.
    • Amendment of the Government Organization Act is essential for MCIB establishment. To place it under the Ministry of Public Administration and Security as proposed by the Democratic Party, MCIB establishment provisions must be added to Article 26 (Ministry of Public Administration and Security) of the Government Organization Act. However, this requires presidential consent, making it difficult to realize without political agreement.

5️⃣ Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Q: What would prosecutors do if the Major Crimes Investigation Bureau is established?

A: Prosecutors would transform into pure prosecution agencies focusing only on prosecution and trial maintenance.

  • If the MCIB is established, prosecutors' roles would fundamentally change. First, they would lose all direct investigation powers and only decide whether to prosecute. They would only review investigation results from the MCIB or police to determine if criminal charges are warranted and file public prosecutions. Second, they would conduct trials in court and bear the burden of proving guilt. Their main work would be proving defendants' criminal facts in trials and demanding appropriate sentences. Third, maintaining prosecutions in appeals and supreme court cases would remain an important prosecutorial role.
  • This is similar to prosecution-only agencies in foreign countries. Like federal prosecutors in the US or the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in the UK, professional investigation agencies handle investigations while prosecutors concentrate expertise on prosecution and trials. While prosecutors would be smaller in scale than currently, their expertise in prosecution and trial areas would be expected to increase.

Q: Could the MCIB establishment actually weaken investigation capabilities?

A: There may be initial confusion, but long-term expertise improvement effects are expected to be significant.

  • There would definitely be difficulties in the early stages of MCIB establishment. First, how to transfer veteran investigators from existing special prosecution departments to the MCIB is a major challenge. Complex economic crime investigations could become difficult without securing experienced personnel. Second, work gaps or poor inter-agency cooperation could disrupt investigations during the new agency establishment process. Third, considerable time would be needed for system construction and personnel training.
  • However, investigation capabilities could actually improve in the medium to long term. Since the MCIB would specialize only in complex economic crimes, it could intensively accumulate expertise in that area. Also, an environment would be created to focus purely on investigations, free from political pressure on prosecutors. Overseas cases show that independent investigation agencies often perform better in specialized fields. However, sufficient preparation time and systematic system construction must be prerequisites for such effects to appear.

Q: Is there no possibility that the National Investigation Committee could be politically abused?

A: Depending on institutional design, it could either prevent political interference or actually expand it, requiring a careful approach.

  • Securing the National Investigation Committee's political neutrality is a key factor in the MCIB's success. Looking at concerns, first, political influence could work in the member composition process. If member appointers or recommending institutions have specific political leanings, there's a risk of forming a biased committee. Second, the Prime Minister reporting system could become a channel for administrative interference. There are structural problems where the government could pressure politically sensitive cases.
  • However, political interference can be sufficiently prevented with appropriate institutional mechanisms. Methods include balanced member composition from various fields and setting terms that stagger with political schedules. It's also important to limit roles to supervision and coordination rather than investigation command authority to prevent direct case interference. By referencing overseas independent investigation supervisory bodies and building sophisticated systems that guarantee political neutrality, it would be possible to create a more fair investigation environment than currently exists.

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